

Hampshire Water Transfer and Water Recycling Project

Environmental Statement – Chapter 14 Major accidents and disasters

VOLUME NUMBER: 6

PLANNING INSPECTORATE NUMBER: WA010002

APPLICATION DOCUMENT REFERENCE: 6.1

APFP REGULATION: 5(2)(a)

May 2026

Version 0



from
**Southern
Water.** 

The Southern Water logo consists of three stylized, wavy blue lines of varying lengths, positioned to the right of the text 'Southern Water'.

Contents

14	Major accidents and disasters	1
14.1	Introduction	1
14.2	Legislation, policy and guidance	2
14.3	Consultation, scoping and engagement	6
14.4	Primary and tertiary mitigation.....	11
14.5	Assessment methodology	19
14.6	Assumptions and limitations.....	26
14.7	Baseline conditions	26
14.8	Assessment of risk events and their potential effects.....	30
14.9	Mitigation, monitoring and enhancement	39
14.10	Summary of residual effects.....	39
	References	41

Tables

Table 14-1	List of relevant legislation.....	2
Table 14-2	List of relevant national policy.....	4
Table 14-3	List of relevant local planning authority emergency plans	5
Table 14-4	Environmental Impact Assessment Scoping Opinion – Planning Inspectorate comments	6
Table 14-5	Summary of the scope for major accidents and disasters assessment	19
Table 14-6	Data sources used to inform the major accidents and disasters assessment.....	22
Table 14-7	Definitions of UXO Hazard Level for a site	23
Table 14-8	Summary of risk identification and assessment for construction.....	32
Table 14-9	Summary of risk identification and assessment for operation	33
Table 14-10	Summary of residual effects	39

14 Major accidents and disasters

14.1 Introduction

- 14.1.1 This chapter sets out an assessment and description of the expected significant adverse effects of the Hampshire Water Transfer and Water Recycling Project (hereafter referred to as the 'Proposed Development') on the environment deriving from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and disasters which are relevant to the Proposed Development.
- 14.1.2 This chapter details the legislation, policy and guidance that is relevant to major accidents and disasters, summarises the engagement and consultation undertaken to date, sets out the scope and methodology of assessment, and describes the baseline environment. Following this, the chapter sets out an assessment and description of the expected significant adverse effects of the Proposed Development on the environment deriving from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and disasters which are relevant to the Proposed Development. The description includes measures envisaged to prevent or mitigate the significant adverse effects of such events on the environment and details of the preparedness for and proposed response to such emergencies [1]. The requirement for embedded primary and tertiary mitigation for major accidents and disasters risks is incorporated in the design of the Proposed Development. The need for any secondary mitigation is then considered along with any proposals for monitoring and/or enhancement. The chapter concludes with a summary of residual effects.
- 14.1.3 Whilst this Environmental Statement (ES) presents an assessment of the effects that may occur from decommissioning activities of the Proposed Development, Southern Water Services ('the Applicant') is not seeking consent for decommissioning.
- 14.1.4 This chapter should be read in conjunction with ES Chapter 3 Description of the Proposed Development, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) which describes the development parameters against which the effects considered in this chapter have been assessed.
- 14.1.5 In addition, this chapter should be read alongside relevant parts of other chapters in Volume I, namely:
1. ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) – covers ecological designated sites, habitats and protected and notable species, providing information on the receptors that a major accident or disaster could potentially impact.
 2. ES Chapter 9 Marine biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) – covers marine ecological designated sites, habitats and protected and notable species, providing information on the receptors that a major accident or disaster could potentially impact.
 3. ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) – provides the locations of historic landfill sites on the site of the Proposed Development, informing assessments on the risk of

landfill related fires and release of harmful gases in this major accidents and disasters chapter.

4. ES Chapter 18 Traffic and transport, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) – provides an assessment of the likelihood of traffic accidents associated with the Proposed Development, providing the baseline for the risk of transport accidents.
5. ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) – provides baseline information from the flooding and water quality assessment relevant to the Proposed Development that is used to inform the assessment of flood related major accidents and disasters.
6. ES Chapter 20 Cumulative and in-combination effects, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) – an assessment of the cumulative effects i.e. effects from the interrelationship between the Proposed Development and other developments, and an assessment of the in-combination effects i.e. effects from the interaction between the individual effects of the Proposed Development.

14.1.6 This chapter is supported by the following appendices, both contained in ES Volume II (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6):

1. ES Appendix 14.1 Stage 2 risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6)
2. ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6)

14.2 Legislation, policy and guidance

14.2.1 This section identifies the legislation, policy, guidance and other documentation that has informed the assessment and description of expected significant adverse effects on the environment resulting from the Proposed Development’s vulnerability to the risks of major accidents and disasters.

Legislation

14.2.2 Table 14-1 lists the legislation relevant to the major accidents and disasters assessment.

Table 14-1 List of relevant legislation

Legislation	Relevance to assessment
Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (HSWA) [2]	Sets out the framework for the regulation of occupational health and safety in the United Kingdom (UK), including the basic health and safety duties of a company, its directors, managers and employees. It also acts as the framework for other health and safety regulations which set out more comprehensive provisions. The key principle of the HSWA is that the health and safety and welfare of all employees is assured as far as is reasonably practicable, with satisfactory records maintained to show that this has been undertaken.
The Management of Health and Safety at	These regulations contain more specific details about employers’ health and safety duties under the HSWA.

Legislation	Relevance to assessment
Work Regulations 1999 [3]	The construction and operation of the Proposed Development will need to adhere to these regulations.
The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 2002 [4]	<p>Sets out minimum requirements for the protection of workers from explosion and fire risks in relation to dangerous substances or potentially explosive atmospheres.</p> <p>Operation of the Proposed Development would require a Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere assessment to be carried out in line with legislative requirements to determine the level of explosiveness for chemicals transported, sorted or used for operation of the Proposed Development.</p>
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 [5]	<p>Sets out the roles and responsibilities for responding to a major accident or disaster at a local level.</p> <p>Local planning authorities and primary responders such as the emergency services are required to have emergency plans and business continuity management arrangements. They must assess the risk of emergencies occurring and make information available to the public. They must also form 'Local Resilience Forums' who publish Community Risk Registers, and co-ordinate and co-operate between responders.</p> <p>The list of potential major accidents and disaster sources have been informed by the National and Hampshire and Isle of Wight Community Risk Registers, published by the relevant Local Resilience Forums.</p>
Construction Design and Management (CDM) 2015 Regulations [6]	<p>These regulations place duties on clients, designers, and Contractors to ensure health and safety is taken into account for the lifecycle of a project from construction to decommissioning. Under the CDM Regulations, designers are required to avoid potential risks so far as is reasonably practicable through measures such as the removal of hazards from construction, cleaning and maintenance, during the proposed use and decommissioning of a project. Where risks cannot be avoided, designers are required, so far as reasonably practicable, to take steps to reduce or control the risks, and provide necessary information on the risks to the principle designer.</p> <p>The design of the Proposed Development is required to take health and safety measures into account, and improve safety through design, in accordance with these CDM Regulations.</p>
Seveso III Directive 2015 [7]	<p>The Seveso III Directive involves the control of onshore major accident hazards involving dangerous substances.</p> <p>The Directive has been used to inform the significance threshold for the Proposed Development for major accidents and disasters.</p>

National policy

- 14.2.3 The primary policy for determining the application for the Development Consent Order (DCO) for the Proposed Development is the National Policy Statement for water resources infrastructure (NPSWRI) [8]. This sets out policies to guide how DCO applications for water resources infrastructure should be decided and how the effects of such infrastructure are considered.
- 14.2.4 Table 14-2 lists the paragraphs from the NPSWRI and other national policy that are relevant to the major accidents and disasters assessment. It also sets out where these policy requirements are addressed within the chapter.

Table 14-2 List of relevant national policy

Relevant paragraph reference	Summary of policy requirement	Where addressed in chapter
National Policy Statement for water resources infrastructure [2025] [8]		
Safety: paragraphs 3.10.1, 3.10.5 to 3.10.6	Paragraph 3.10.1 states that ' <i>for all water resources infrastructure types, relevant bodies such as local authorities and the Health and Safety Executive are statutory consultees that should be consulted, where required, on matters relating to safety</i> '. Paragraph 3.10.5 states that, under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Regulations, there is a requirement to consider the implications of major accidents and disasters. Paragraph 3.10.6 notes that ' <i>Under the Water Industry Act 1991, water companies have powers to introduce byelaws, which could address operational issues relating to public safety, access and security of facilities</i> '.	This policy requirement has been addressed throughout the chapter, particularly in paragraph 14.3.7, and ES Appendix 14.1 Stage 2 risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).
Security considerations: paragraphs 3.11.1 to 3.11.6	These paragraphs describe how government policy is to ensure that ' <i>proportionate protective security measures</i> ' are designed into infrastructure projects at an early stage. They also set out considerations for the location of projects in relation to existing Ministry of Defence (MoD) sites, sensitive information restrictions in applications, the grounds for a closed hearing and consultation with Defra in the event of national security implications.	This policy requirement has been addressed in paragraph 14.3.11.
National Planning Policy Framework [2025] [9]		
Section 8, paragraph 102	Sub-paragraph 102a provides that planning decisions should promote public safety and take into account wider security and defence requirements by anticipating and addressing possible malicious threats and natural hazards, including appropriate and proportionate steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience and ensure public safety and security. Sub-	The approach to considering security requirements and ensuring public safety has been detailed in paragraph 14.4.20.

Relevant paragraph reference	Summary of policy requirement	Where addressed in chapter
	paragraph b) sets out that decisions should also ensure that operational defence and security sites are not adversely affected by other development.	

Local policy

14.2.5 Adopted and emerging development plan policies have been considered. However, none of these are considered relevant to the major accidents and disasters assessment.

Guidance, standards and advice

14.2.6 The major accidents and disasters assessment has been undertaken in accordance with relevant guidance and has been compiled in accordance with professional standards.

14.2.7 The guidance which relates to this assessment is the Institute of Sustainability and Environmental Professionals (ISEP) (formerly the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment) (2020) Major Accidents and Disasters in EIA: An ISEP Primer [10] (hereinafter referred to as the 'ISEP Primer'), which follows a risk identification approach. This is the most commonly used approach and has therefore been used to inform the baseline and definition of assessment scope. It has also been used to assess likely significance in relation to risk and to inform mitigation where needed.

14.2.8 In addition to the relevant policy listed in Table 14-2, Table 14-3 outlines which organisations would be responsible for leading the response to various scenarios. These underpin the good practice responses to the risks highlighted in this assessment.

Table 14-3 List of relevant local planning authority emergency plans

Local planning authority	Emergency plan	Relevance to assessment
Eastleigh Borough Council (EBC)	Eastleigh Borough Council Emergency Planning [11]	The organisations are those which would be responsible for leading the response to various scenarios set out in the plans. The plans also set out what the community can do to prepare for and during an incident.
Fareham Borough Council (FBC)	Fareham Borough Council Emergency Response Plan [12]	
Hampshire County Council (HCC)	Hampshire County Council Emergency Planning [13]	
Havant Borough Council (HBC)	Havant Borough Council Emergency Advice [14]	
Portsmouth City Council (PCC)	Portsmouth City Council Emergency Response Plan [15]	
Winchester City Council (WCC)	Winchester City Council Emergencies and Emergency Planning [16]	

14.3 Consultation, scoping and engagement

Consultation

14.3.1 Feedback received from stakeholders for each consultation relevant to major accidents and disasters is summarised within the Consultation Report (Document reference 5.1, DCO Volume 5), including how the Proposed Development has had regard to the feedback. These cover the consultation responses received for the following consultations:

1. Summer 2022 Consultation
2. Summer 2024 Consultation
3. Spring 2025 Consultation
4. Autumn 2025 Consultation
5. Spring 2026 Consultation

Environmental Impact Assessment scoping

14.3.2 An EIA Scoping Opinion was adopted by the Planning Inspectorate on behalf of the Secretary of State (SoS) on 31 August 2023. A full list of the EIA Scoping Opinion comments made by the Planning Inspectorate and a response to those comments are provided in ES Appendix 5.3 Response to EIA Scoping Opinion, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).

14.3.3 Comments received in relation to major accidents and disasters are set out in Table 14-4, describing how and where these are addressed in the ES.

Table 14-4 Environmental Impact Assessment Scoping Opinion – Planning Inspectorate comments

Scoping Opinion ID	Summary of Scoping Opinion comment	How the ES addresses the Scoping Opinion comment	Where addressed in the ES
ID 3.15.1	The EIA Scoping Opinion agreed risks to or from the Proposed Development in respect of sites regulated under the Control of Major Accidents and Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 2015 can be scoped out of the assessment on the basis that no COMAH sites have been identified within 4.8km of the Proposed Development.	The Proposed Development itself will not be a COMAH site and no COMAH sites have been identified within 4.8km of the Proposed Development. Additional detail has been added to section 14.4.	Section 14.4
ID 3.15.2	The EIA Scoping Opinion should include an assessment of the risk of major accidents and disasters during the decommissioning phase.	This assessment considers the potential for effects to arise during decommissioning, and whether they would be different to or greater than those identified during the construction phase.	Section 14.5 and 14.8

Scoping Opinion ID	Summary of Scoping Opinion comment	How the ES addresses the Scoping Opinion comment	Where addressed in the ES
ID 3.15.3	The EIA Scoping Opinion stated the ES should identify any requirements of other regulatory health and safety related regimes including relevant legislation and any permits or licences, and progress to securing these where they may impact on the effectiveness or delivery of avoidance or mitigation measures.	Relevant health and safety regulatory regimes are included in the ES, along with requirements. Details on the progress to securing the permits and licenses required for the construction and operation of the Proposed Development are provided in the Other Consents and Licences Position Statement (Document reference 5.4, DCO Volume 5).	Table 14-1 in section 14.2 and Other Consents and Licences Position Statement (Document reference 5.4, DCO Volume 5).
ID 3.15.4	The EIA Scoping Opinion agreed risks to or from the Proposed Development from widespread electricity failure, system failures and attacks can be scoped out of the assessment on the basis they are managed through the mitigation measures identified in the EIA Scoping Report.	Relevant mitigation measures are summarised in this chapter and committed to in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) and Operational Environmental Management Plan (OEMP) (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). An additional risk – water quality – was identified for system failures after the scoping stage. The risk is set out in section 14.7.25 and mitigation is set out in section 14.4.	Sections 14.7.25 and 14.4
ID 3.15.5	The EIA Scoping Opinion should include an assessment of the risk of a major accident or disaster from fire, specifically in relation to the Proposed Development's interaction with a historic landfill site.	This assessment considers the risk of a major accident or disaster from fire.	Section 14.7.25
ID 3.15.6	The EIA Scoping Opinion should provide baseline information on the risk of unexploded ordnance (UXO), likely significant effect and relevant mitigation.	This assessment considers the UXO baseline and its likelihood for resulting in an adverse significant effect. A UXO risk check has been undertaken and presented in ES Appendix 14.2, Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).	Section 14.7, 14.8 and ES Appendix 14.2, Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document

Scoping Opinion ID	Summary of Scoping Opinion comment	How the ES addresses the Scoping Opinion comment	Where addressed in the ES
			reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).
ID 3.15.6	The EIA Scoping Opinion should include identification of potential impact pathways to and from the Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port and any mitigation required to address such effects.	Engagement has been undertaken with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to confirm that neither the Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port nor the Proposed Development would be likely to impact each other in a manner exceeding that of other land uses in the vicinity which is detailed in the Statement of Common Ground - Ministry of Defence. The distance between them is illustrated in ES Figure 14.1 Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port location in relation to the Proposed Development, Volume III (Document reference 6.3, DCO Volume 6). Therefore, this has been scoped out as a risk.	Section 14.3
ID 3.15.7	The EIA Scoping Opinion should include assessment of the risk of a major accident or disaster occurring from bird strike, due to an increased number of birds flying near the Southampton Airport's flight path.	A risk assessment report has been shared with Southampton Airport. Engagement has been undertaken with Southampton Airport to agree appropriate mitigation. The mitigation is contained in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) which is secured by a requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO (Document reference 3.1, DCO Volume 3).	Section 14.4 and 14.4
ID 3.15.8	The EIA Scoping Opinion should include assessment of the risk of a major accident or disaster occurring from industrial accidents or pollution, including flooding from a high-pressure water pipe leak.	This assessment considers the risk of an industrial accident or pollution incident, including flooding from a high-pressure water pipe leak or rupture.	Section 14.7.25
ID 3.15.9	The EIA Scoping Opinion confirmed the following assessments are not required in	Relevant mitigation measures are summarised in this chapter and secured in the	Section 14.4

Scoping Opinion ID	Summary of Scoping Opinion comment	How the ES addresses the Scoping Opinion comment	Where addressed in the ES
	the ES, subject to relevant details provided in outline or draft management plans: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flooding, during construction • Severe weather, during construction and operation • Air quality, dust during construction • Transport accidents, aside from hazardous loads as these are considered separately per EIA Scoping Opinion ID 3.15.8, during construction and operation • Pollution incidents during construction 	Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) and OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7).	
ID 3.5.9	The EIA Scoping Opinion should include further details on the interaction between the Havant Thicket Reservoir and the Proposed Development.	Section 19.8 in ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) considers this interaction.	Section 19.8 in ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6)
ID 3.15.10	The EIA Scoping Opinion confirmed air quality and system failures during operation can be scoped out of the assessment.	No additional information provided in the ES.	No additional information provided in the ES.

Engagement

14.3.4 This section provides details of the ongoing technical engagement that has been undertaken with stakeholders in relation to major accidents and disasters.

Environmental Impact Assessment Working Groups

14.3.5 Five EIA Working Groups have been established as forums for ongoing engagement with statutory bodies regarding the Proposed Development. These Working Groups when combined cover all of the assessment topics considered by the EIA. A full description of each of the EIA Working Groups, the key stakeholders, and an overview of the topics presented can be found in ES Chapter 5 EIA approach and methodology, Volume I, (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6). This section presents a summary of the topics covered in the EIA Working Groups which are of relevance for the major accidents and disasters assessment.

- 14.3.6 The Resilience EIA Working Group, which includes climate change, flood risk, major accidents and disasters and cumulative and in-combination effects, has been the main forum for engagement for major accidents and disasters. There have been 12 Resilience EIA Working Group meetings between Summer 2022 and DCO application. Technical officers from EBC, Environment Agency (EA), FBC, Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire and Rescue Authority, HBC, HCC, Hampshire Police and Crime Commissioner, PCC and WCC attended the EIA Working Group meetings.
- 14.3.7 The following overarching themes were covered across the EIA Working Group meetings:
1. Introduction and background to the Proposed Development.
 2. Overview of the baseline environment.
 3. EIA scoping which included setting out the proposed approach to EIA scoping, providing an overview of the EIA Scoping Report and seeking feedback on the EIA Scoping Opinion. During this meeting, all stakeholders who attended were satisfied with the scoping out of all potential risks for the major accidents and disasters topic.
 4. An overview of the Preliminary Environmental Information (PEI) Report, including setting out the baseline and approach to mitigation, as well as providing an overview of the PEI Report findings. During this meeting, it was confirmed that all stakeholders who attended were satisfied that the comments raised in the EIA Scoping Opinion would be addressed in the PEI Report and ES.
 5. Updates on the approach to development of the design of the Proposed Development.
 6. Briefings on the materials to be consulted on, including design and environmental assessment related matters, ahead of the Summer 2022, Summer 2024 and Spring 2025 Consultations.
 7. Approach to mitigation, Commitments Register (ES Appendix 5.5 Commitments Register, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6)) and associated management plans to be provided with the DCO application.
 8. Consultation feedback and updates on scheme development, and design principles following the Summer 2024 Consultation and PEI Report.
 9. Updates on EIA progress and development of mitigation, including management plans and the Commitments Register.
 10. An overview of the ES, including setting out the baseline and any updates from the PEI Report, as well as providing an overview of the findings of the chapter.
- 14.3.8 Only one comment was received as part of the EIA Working Groups and matters resolved in relation to major accidents and disasters. This was a query from the EA around whether groundwater flooding would be covered within the scope of the major accidents and disasters assessment. It was confirmed to the EIA Working Group that this would be covered by ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).

Other engagement

- 14.3.9 Engagement with other stakeholders has also been undertaken outside of the EIA Working Groups in relation to specific topics.

Southampton Airport

- 14.3.10 Engagement has been undertaken with Southampton Airport to agree appropriate mitigation, summarised in section 14.4, for the risk of bird strike during the construction phase of the Proposed Development. The risk is present due to the proposed use of temporary lagoons which could attract increased numbers of birds.

Ministry of Defence

- 14.3.11 Engagement has been undertaken with the MoD to confirm that neither the Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port nor the Proposed Development would be likely to impact each other in a manner exceeding that of other land uses in the vicinity due to the distance between the Proposed Development and port (as shown in ES Figure 14.1 Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port location in relation to the Proposed Development, Volume III (Document reference 6.3, DCO Volume 6). This approach was confirmed with local planning authorities in the Resilience Working Group meeting on the 2 December 2024. As such, the risk has been scoped out of the assessment.

14.4 Primary and tertiary mitigation

Primary measures

- 14.4.1 As described in ES Chapter 3 Description of Proposed Development, Volume I, (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) a range of measures have been embedded into the Proposed Development design to avoid or reduce environmental effects. These primary mitigation measures specific to major accidents and disasters, which have been incorporated into the assessed design, are:
1. The results of utility searches, which show where different utilities are located within the Order Limits, have been used to inform the design and ensure the utilities identified are avoided where possible. This is as secured within the Works Plans (Document reference 2.3, DCO Volume 2).
 2. The temporary construction compounds have been sited to avoid identified flood risk zones 2 or 3 where possible, as detailed in ES Appendix 19.1 Flood Risk Assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).
 3. Protective strips over the entire alignment of the pipelines constructed using open-cut methods are required to: ensure space and access to enable maintenance and repair, protect the integrity of the pipeline from external influences, for example loading, and protect third party assets from potential damage in the event of a rupture. The protective strip would restrict the landowner or occupier from undertaking certain activities that would restrict access to or affect the integrity of the pipeline. This includes restricting the following activities: erecting, constructing or placing any building wall or other

structure whether permanent or temporary, undertaking of any piling or percussive works, alteration of ground levels, planting of trees, shrubs or other species other than as set out by the Applicant's 'Guide to Tree Planting near Mains and Sewers' [17] or other relevant standards and construction or laying of new pipe duct or cable across the pipeline at an angle of less than forty-five degrees formed by the pipeline and the new pipe duct or cable. Relevant landowners will be advised of the extent of the protective strip on their land. This will be determined by the depth and location of the pipeline.

4. Isolation valves will be installed on the Pipeline to reduce flooding in the event of a pipe leak or rupture.
5. For the operational phase fire risks, a Landfill Gas Risk Assessment has been undertaken and is detailed in ES Appendix 11.2 Ground investigation reports, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). Ground gas protection measures will be installed where required for the construction of buildings on a landfill. These measures may include the structural barrier of the floor slab, ventilation measures and a gas resistant membrane. A specialist gas protection measures designer will be engaged to design these measures. These measures are secured in the design principles for safety as set out the Design Principles Document, DCO Volume 5 (Document reference 5.11, DCO Volume 5).
6. For operational phase water quality risks, all the pumps and equipment in the pumping stations at the Water Recycling Plant (WRP) site are equipped with remote monitoring and control which will indicate an issue with water quality were there to be a problem. The WRP site will be operational 24 hours a day and it is assumed that operatives will be in attendance 24 hours a day with approximately five operatives during the day and three during the night. An emergency generator will be provided as part of the WRP site which will be used when required. The emergency generator will be a fuel powered generator used to create electrical power in an emergency situation, for example during lack of power. In these events, the emergency generator will run until power to the WRP site is returned.
7. For operational phase Invasive Non-Native Species (INNS) biosecurity risks, works are proposed at Otterbourne WSW. This will ensure the addition of source water, transferred from Havant Thicket Reservoir, will not introduce pathways for the spread of INNS. The INNS Treatment would treat the waste flow that is produced by the existing treatment process at Otterbourne WSW, once all flows have passed through Otterbourne WSW. Following INNS Treatment, these flows would be released to the environment via the Applicant's existing network. The INNS Treatment would produce sludge, which would be disposed of via a suitably licensed disposal facility, therefore avoiding the spread of INNS.

Tertiary measures

Construction

- 14.4.2 Good construction practices are set out in the Outline Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP), (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) which is secured by a requirement in Schedule 2 in the draft DCO (Document reference

3.1, DCO Volume 3) and will manage the effects of construction. The measures of particular relevance to major accidents and disasters, which are included in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) are:

Flooding

- 14.4.3 The mitigation for flooding is set out in the ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) and accompanying ES Appendix 19.1 Flood Risk Assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6) which details measures contained in and is secured through the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7), Other Consents and Licences Position Statement (Document reference 5.4, DCO Volume 5) and ES Appendix 19.9 Outline Water Monitoring Plan, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.4.4 Some temporary construction compounds have areas located within flood zones 2 or 3. Flood risk mitigation measures covering the temporary construction compounds are secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7), including (but not limited to):
1. Monitoring water levels, signing up to the EA's flood warning system, and ensuring that there is an emergency evacuation plan in place.
 2. Minimising the storage of materials or equipment in the highest flood risk areas.
 3. Raising temporary portacabins so that they are above the ground surface.
- 14.4.5 The compounds will each be subject to a site specific risk assessment undertaken by the Contractor and confirmation that displaced floodwaters will not impact other areas including third party land and buildings.
- 14.4.6 Where construction works occur within a flood zone 2 or 3, the Contractor will be obliged to carry out a risk assessment and install necessary control measures to mitigate the risk of flooding as set out in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7). Any additional mitigation required is set out in the ES Appendix 19.1 Flood Risk Assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6), and ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to 'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP).

Widespread electricity failure and system failures

- 14.4.7 A refresh of data on the locations of utilities will be undertaken at reasonable points during the design and construction of the Proposed Development to provide relevant information to the Contractor to help them plan, manage, monitor and coordinate health and safety in the construction phase.
- 14.4.8 The Contractor will include this information in their Permit to Dig (a document ensuring health and safety measures are followed during excavations). This will include details for an emergency response which will be employed should a utility be damaged. The requirement for the Permit to Dig is secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7).
- 14.4.9 Protective provisions will be included in the DCO for the benefit of undertakers, such as Southern Gas Networks. Protective Provisions manage the interface between the Proposed Development and third party undertakers' apparatus, which

when in place, will mitigate the risk of damage to the asset. The Applicant is progressing ongoing engagement with relevant third party undertakers on protective provisions and managing the interface with their apparatus. This mitigation is detailed in the draft DCO (Document reference 3.1, DCO Volume 3) and is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Fire

- 14.4.10 The Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) secures good practice construction measures with regards to the storage of fuel and plant to reduce the risk of fire, as far as possible, from these sources.
- 14.4.11 In addition, the Contractor will include the risk of fire and the way in which they will respond to an incident involving fire in an emergency management plan which they will produce. The production of the emergency management plan is secured through the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7). The emergency management plan will be agreed with relevant planning authority, in consultation with the fire and rescue/emergency services.
- 14.4.12 For the risk of fire from landfill gas during construction, gas management will be addressed through method statements. These will include details of mitigation measures to reduce the risk of fire caused by landfill gas, primarily through ventilation. All flammable gases will be monitored during construction activities on the landfill site with work stopped if the threshold alarm is triggered. If natural ventilation is insufficient to maintain gas concentrations at safe levels, forced ventilation may be employed by pumping air into construction shafts and vacuum extraction of air from the bottom of construction shafts. Sources of ignition will also be prevented with equipment that is designed not to operate at high temperatures or generate sparks, as well as a no smoking or naked flames requirement enforced at the site. The requirement for these method statements is secured through the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7).
- 14.4.13 This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk of fire during construction to ALARP.

Unexploded ordnance

- 14.4.14 For the reduction of risk posed by UXO, various types of tertiary mitigation that are appropriate to the risk level are secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7). These include, but are not limited to, a UXO Safety and Awareness Briefing, Site Specific Safety Instructions, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Engineer Watching Brief and magnetometer surveys. For full details see ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Bird strike at Southampton Airport

- 14.4.15 Mitigation for the risk of bird strike is secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7).
- 14.4.16 This has been agreed with Southampton Airport and includes measures such as installation of mesh fencing around the perimeter of the temporary storage lagoon,

prior to filling with water, to prevent direct movement of wildfowl from adjacent terrestrial habitat. Therefore, this risk is mitigated to ALARP.

Pollution incidents

- 14.4.17 The Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) includes a requirement for a Pollution Prevention Management Plan to be produced by the Contractor for pollution events. This provides details on how to handle and report environmental incidents, including measures to manage spills (e.g. through the use of a spill kit), and to clean up following an incident, including a potential incident associated with hazardous loads being transported for construction, and good practice pollution prevention measures. In addition, the Contractor will adhere to the standards set out in the British Drilling Society (2008) Guidance for Safe Intrusive Activities on Contaminated or Potentially Contaminated Land [18] and any updated guidance. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Consents

- 14.4.18 Hazardous Substances Consent will not be required for the construction of the Proposed Development as the hazardous substances used during construction do not meet the volume thresholds requiring such consent. The storage, transport and handling mitigation measures to prevent pollution incidents and other risk events from hazardous substances are secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Operation

- 14.4.19 The following tertiary mitigation measures are relevant to the operation of the Proposed Development.

Flooding

- 14.4.20 Mitigation for the very unlikely emergency use of washouts during the operation of the Proposed Development is provided in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7), secured by a requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO (Document reference 3.1, DCO Volume 3). Washouts may be discharged to the environment without constraint where necessary to alleviate the situation and protect public safety. Following the emergency discharge, the clean-up operation would implement all reasonably practicable measures to mitigate environmental impacts. An Emergency Response plan will be developed by the Contractor which will set out these procedures. The mitigation for flooding, as a result of the emergency use of washouts, will follow the same measures as those set out for flooding and pipe leak or rupture in paragraph 14.4.28.
- 14.4.21 The risk of INNS from the release of raw water from an emergency washout release or pipe leak or rupture will be mitigated through the preparation and implementation of an Emergency INNS Management Plan (EIMP) which will be developed by the Contractor post-consent as detailed in the INNS Biosecurity Plan (Document reference 7.10, DCO Volume 7), secured by a requirement in Schedule 2 to the draft DCO (Document reference 3.1, DCO Volume 3). The EIMP would set out the processes and procedure for releasing and managing water in an

emergency, including procedures to assess and identify the current threat of INNS associated with the emergency event, for containment and eradication and a plan for regular monitoring and follow-up. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

14.4.22 Mitigation for the emergency use of overflows for Break Pressure Tanks BPT-K and BPT/IPS-E during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). It is very unlikely to occur as a situation leading to an overflow will require the simultaneous failure of all of the following multiple system elements:

1. Unexpected downstream cessation or throttling of flows.
2. Failure of normal automated control systems to maintain normal BPT levels.
3. Undetected operationally exceptional rise in BPT levels, failure of automatic emergency response or unresponsive manual intervention from the control room upon reaction to an alarm.

14.4.23 However, were this to occur and an overflow happen, the flows would eventually top the overflow within the collection chamber and flow out to the discharge location. If the overflow volume is less than the effective volume of the collection chamber, i.e. the overflow stops before reaching the outlet to discharge, no flows will be released to the environment, and this volume will be removed by suction tanker. In the case of a flooding event, the mitigation would be the same as that set out for pipe leak or rupture. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Fire

14.4.24 Mitigation for the risk of fire during operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). The OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) requires an Emergency Response Plan to be produced at a later stage. Measures which will be included in the Emergency Response Plan include staff training, routine safety audits, rescue planning, evacuation procedures and clearly defined protocols to minimise the likelihood of fire or other hazardous incidents. There will be requirements for the WRP site and Above Ground Plant (AGP) to have emergency backup generators in the event that mains power is interrupted. The measures will satisfy legislated plans and protocols, such as the Fire Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RRO), and be in line with best practice operational protocols.

14.4.25 An Emergency Response Plan will be developed and will include mitigation to deal with wildfire. Site-specific wildfire risk assessments will be undertaken and mitigation measures will include coordination with Fire and Rescue Services, and post-incident recovery actions. Vegetation management strategies have also been built into the design. These measures align with Natural England's NEER014 guidance and the Forestry Commission's wildfire resilience framework and relevant UK obligations under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 and HSE Fire Safety in Construction (HSG168) guidance. This is secured through the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Industrial accidents

Hazardous chemicals

- 14.4.26 Mitigation measures for the risks associated with hazardous chemical storage, use and chemical explosions during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) in accordance with the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) 2002 [19]
- 14.4.27 If a spillage were to occur during operation, pollution prevention measures as secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) will be employed as well as the aforementioned safety measures for handling hazardous chemicals. The Contractor will implement a Pollution Management Plan which will satisfy legislated plans and protocols and be in line with best practice to manage pollution for operational matters. Measures in the Plan will include response procedures, timescales and notification requirements. It will complement and be consistent with the emergency response plan covering mitigation for other risks. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Flooding and pipe leak or rupture

- 14.4.28 Mitigation measures for the risk of pipe leak or rupture and associated flooding are secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). It requires an Emergency Response Plan to be produced at a future stage that will contain response procedures, including communication and coordination procedures with emergency services and measures for public safety, both in the immediate pipe leak or rupture vicinity and the overall system. Incident classification and escalation protocols in accordance with the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 will be produced and environmental containment measures, including coordination with environmental authorities, where reasonably practicable. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Pollution incident

- 14.4.29 The Contractor will implement a Pollution Management Plan which will satisfy legislated plans and protocols and be in line with best practice for managing pollution for operational matters. Measures in the Plan will include response procedures, timescales and notification requirements. It will complement and be consistent with the Emergency Response Plan which sets out mitigation for other risks. This is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). In the event of a pollution incident, the measures will be employed, including the aforementioned safety measures for handling hazardous chemicals if required. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Transport accidents

- 14.4.30 ES Chapter 18 Traffic and transport, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), assesses the risks associated with hazardous loads during operation of the Proposed Development. It concludes that the minor increase in daily vehicle movements involving hazardous loads means there is no likely significant effect and therefore the risk is negligible. If a spillage were to occur, the pollution

prevention measures set out in the industrial accidents: hazardous chemicals and pollution section will mitigate the risk. This will be carried out in line with relevant legislation as set out in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP.

Consents

- 14.4.31 Hazardous Substances Consent will not be required for the operation of the Proposed Development as the hazardous substances used do not meet the volume thresholds requiring such consent.
- 14.4.32 The Proposed Development will not be a COMAH site as the quantities of hazardous substances stored and used on site do not exceed the trigger limits stated in the COMAH regulations.

Attacks

- 14.4.33 Mitigation measures for the risk of a malicious attack during operation of the Proposed Development are secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). Physical security measures will include perimeter control, access restrictions and surveillance systems, as well as cybersecurity protocols and staff training. The response framework will align with the UK Cyber Security Strategy (2022-2030), Network and Information Systems Regulations (NIS2), and the Computer Misuse Act 1990, ensuring compliance and resilience against evolving threats and WIA 1991 security Concept Policy. In the event of disruption to the water supply, the Security and Emergency Measures Direction (SEMD) [20] will be followed, which requires a plan to be in place for an alternative supply of essential water. This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP.

System failures

- 14.4.34 The OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) requires the Contractor to develop an Emergency Response Plan which will include a suite of Incident Management procedures which are to be used in circumstances that are unplanned and require an immediate response. These will complement and be consistent with the Pollution Management Plan, setting out procedures to manage water quality in the event of an incident, in alignment with legislated plans and protocols and industry best practice. This is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP.

Decommissioning

- 14.4.35 Decommissioning will be subject to the appropriate permits, consents and regulatory environment at the relevant time. Decommissioning activities are expected to follow good industry practice in place at the time, anticipated to be similar in nature to measures contained in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7).

14.5 Assessment methodology

Scope of assessment

- 14.5.1 Likely significant effects requiring assessment may be temporary or permanent, direct, indirect, secondary, cumulative, in-combination, beneficial or adverse and may occur during construction, operation or decommissioning. Expected likely significant effects on receptors deriving from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and disasters are summarised in Table 14-5. The scope of the assessment has responded to feedback received as detailed in section 14.3.
- 14.5.2 Effects from decommissioning of the Proposed Development are considered to be no greater than those identified during the construction phase and are therefore assessed to be of the same significance as those assessed for construction. Refer to section 3.7 of ES Chapter 3 Description of Proposed Development, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) for additional information on decommissioning.
- 14.5.3 Cumulative effects are those resulting from the interrelationship between the Proposed Development and other developments (inter-project). This major accidents and disasters assessment inherently takes a cumulative approach by considering the vulnerability of the Proposed Development and environment to risk events, including where these risk events may occur on third party developments or land. Therefore there is no separate cumulative effects assessment for major accidents and disasters presented in ES Chapter 20 Cumulative and in-combination effects, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.4 In-combination effects are those that result from the interaction of individual effects combined together on a single receptor or resource at a single point in time. Where a receptor is affected by multiple topics and there is the potential for significant in-combination effects to occur, these aggregated effects are reported within ES Chapter 20 Cumulative and in-combination effects, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.5 Table 14-5 sets out the summary of the scope for the assessment in this chapter. All scoped out elements as agreed in the EIA Scoping Opinion are confirmed in ES Appendix 5.3 Response to EIA Scoping Opinion, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.6 Two additional pathways were identified between production of the PEI Report and ES as a result of ongoing design development. These are emergency use of the washouts and emergency use of the break pressure tank overflows. These are included under the flooding during operation risk in section 14.7 and with full details set out in ES Appendix 14.1 Stage 2 risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).

Table 14-5 Summary of the scope for major accidents and disasters assessment

Receptor	Construction	Operation	Decommissioning
COMAH sites	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out

Receptor	Construction	Operation	Decommissioning
Activities within the scope of other health and safety legislation	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Widespread electrical failure	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Systems failure	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Malicious attack	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Fire	Scoped in	Scoped in	Scoped in
Nuclear submarine port	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Explosion from UXO	Scoped in	Scoped out	Scoped in
Bird strike at Southampton Airport	Scoped in	Scoped out	Scoped out
Industrial accidents	Scoped out	Scoped in	Scoped out
Pollution incidents	Scoped out	Scoped in	Scoped out
Flooding	Scoped out	Scoped in	Scoped out
Severe weather	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Air quality	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Transport accidents	Scoped out	Scoped in	Scoped out

14.5.7 The following risks were scoped out at scoping stage, which was agreed in the EIA Scoping Opinion, on the basis that they would be mitigated through management plans:

1. Air quality (dust during construction)
2. Severe weather (construction and operation)

14.5.8 The Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7) secures the mitigation for dust during construction and severe weather during construction. The OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) secures the requirement for the Contractor to develop robust system which will be designed for operation and maintenance requirements in both planned and emergency conditions, including severe weather during operation.

Study area

14.5.9 This section describes the spatial scope (the area which may be impacted) for the assessment as it applies to major accidents and disasters.

14.5.10 The study area for this assessment has been determined based on a worst case impact area, in the event of a major accident or disaster, informed by the maximum realistic extent of other topic assessment study areas, and includes the extent of the Order Limits. The study area is thus the combined spatial area of the following topic study areas.

- 14.5.11 The study area for ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), covers different designated sites, each with their own related study areas. The largest of these is 10km from the Order Limits for Special Areas of Conservation (SACs). Additional details on the study area for the terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity assessment can be found in section 8.5 of the ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.12 The study area for ES Chapter 9 Marine biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), covers marine ecological designated sites, habitats and protected and notable species. The largest of these is 30km from the Order Limits for sites designated for marine mammals. Additional details on the study area for the terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity assessment can be found in section 9.5 of the ES Chapter 9 Marine biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.13 The study area for ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), varies depending on the receptor, with the greatest extent from the Order Limits being 500m. Additional details on the study area for the land quality and ground conditions assessment can be found in section 11.5 of the ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.14 The study area for ES Chapter 18 Traffic and transport, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), is bound by Winchester and Petersfield in the north, B2149 and Havant in the east, M27 and Langstone in the south and the M3 in the west. Additional details on the study area for the traffic and transport assessment can be found in section 18.5 of the ES Chapter 18 Traffic and transport, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.15 The study area for ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), varies depending on the receptor. Surface fresh water extends to hydrological catchments that intersect with the Proposed Development. Groundwater extends to bodies that underlie the Proposed Development or are hydrologically connected to these bodies. Surface marine water extends to onshore catchments which are part of marine water bodies as outlined above, but also the water bodies within which changes could potentially occur as a result of alterations to the existing release from the Eastney Long Sea Outfall. Additional details on the study area for the water environment assessment can be found in section 19.5 of the ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).
- 14.5.16 External sources of risk (including fire, weather events and so on) which could cause a major accident or disaster to the Proposed Development are also identified and included within the study area.

Assessment scenarios

- 14.5.17 ES Chapter 5 EIA approach and methodology, Volume I, (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) provides an overview of the Proposed Development's approach to the temporal scope (the timescales over which impacts may occur) of the EIA. This section describes the temporal scope for the assessment as it applies to major accidents and disasters.

- 14.5.18 Within the EIA, likely significant effects are determined by assessing and comparing assessment cases or scenarios. These include:
1. Existing baseline
 2. Future baseline
 3. Construction phase
 4. Operational phase
 5. Decommissioning phase
- 14.5.19 The major accidents and disasters assessment considers the potential for a risk event to occur in each of these scenarios. The assessment is not reliant on quantitative analysis of specific years, and instead considers all construction risks within the construction and decommissioning phases, and all relevant operational risks within the operational phase. As such the relevant existing and future baselines are set out within the specific assessments in other chapters.

Baseline methodology

Desk study

- 14.5.20 Baseline data collection has been undertaken to obtain information across the study area. This section provides the approach to collecting baseline data.
- 14.5.21 The following data sources have been accessed to inform the baseline with respect to major accidents and disasters (see Table 14-6). In addition to these data sources, the major accidents and disasters assessment draws on environmental baseline data collated for other topics, specifically, baseline data presented in:
1. ES Chapter 3 Description of the Proposed Development, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6)
 2. ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6)
 3. ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6)
 4. ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6)

Table 14-6 Data sources used to inform the major accidents and disasters assessment

Source of data	Baseline data
Cabinet Office National Risk Register 2025 [21]	Potential risks that could be of relevance to the Proposed Development (Obtained 22/10/2025)
EA flooding data [22]	Location of flood risk areas and proximity to the Proposed Development (Obtained 22/10/2025)
Fire and Rescue Service statistics [23]	Fire and rescue statistics for Hampshire 2024/25 (Obtained 22/09/2023)

Source of data	Baseline data
Hazardous Health and Safety Executive COMAH sites [24]	Information on COMAH sites within 4.8km of the Proposed Development. (Obtained 22/10/2025)
Natural England [25]	Statutory designated sites including their sensitivity to change, and proximity to the Proposed Development (Obtained 22/10/2025)
Zetica and Safelane Global (ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6)	Survey showing the risk of any UXO being encountered during intrusive works during construction
Hampshire and the Isle of Wight Local Resilience Forum [26]	Potential risks that could be of relevance to the Proposed Development as set out on the Community Risk Register (Obtained 22/10/2025)

Site surveys

14.5.22 Detailed UXO surveys were undertaken to examine the risk of any UXO being encountered during intrusive works during construction of the Proposed Development. The UXO risk assessment reports used various sources of information to determine the potential risk level – from very low to very high – for the likelihood that the land within Order Limits is contaminated with UXO. Table 14-7 describes the definitions for each potential risk level as set out in ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).

Table 14-7 Definitions of UXO Hazard Level for a site

Hazard Level	Definition
Very low	There is positive evidence that UXO is not present, e.g. through physical constraints or removal
Low	There is no positive evidence that UXO is present, but its occurrence cannot be totally discounted.
Moderate	There is positive evidence that ordnance was present or that other uncharted ordnance may be present as UXO.
High	There is positive evidence that UXO is present.
Very high	As high, but requires immediate or special attention due to the potential hazard.

14.5.23 The risk level was largely low throughout the Order Limits, with one area of moderate risk. This moderate risk area was identified as a small eastern area within the area identified as 'D Site' by the report. 'D Site' is located approximately

3.7km between Widley and Langstone near Portsmouth, Hampshire, as presented in the UXO reports in ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).

Assessment methodology

- 14.5.24 This chapter's approach and assessment methodology is different to that set out in ES Chapter 5 EIA approach and methodology, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6). The assessment instead follows the accepted industry approach set out in the ISEP Primer [10] and is detailed in the following sections.
- 14.5.25 The assessment of major accidents and disasters is undertaken on a risk assessment basis, in two stages, as follows.

Stage 1: Screening Exercise

- 14.5.26 As part of the risk-based assessment, a Stage 1 Screening Exercise was undertaken at scoping stage and is presented in ES Appendix 5.1 EIA Scoping Report, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). This approach identified the likelihood of an event, and the potential consequences should the event occur, and followed the source-pathway-receptor model. The model questioned whether the Proposed Development could be a source of hazard or interact with any external sources of hazard. If so, it examined if a pathway is present which could cause a likely significant environmental effect to an environmental receptor or if the presence of the Proposed Development could increase the risk of the hazard to occur at its external source. If the answer to either of these questions was yes, the next question was whether existing design measures or legal requirements could adequately control the potential for a major accident and/or disaster or whether this risk was covered by another topic within the ES.
- 14.5.27 In examining the potential consequences of such risks, the following matters were considered:
1. The geographic extent of the effects of the risks. Effects beyond the Order Limits are more likely to be considered significant. The pipeline could be located anywhere within the Limits of Deviation; land between the Limits of Deviation and the Order Limits is classed as 'more significant' (i.e. the same sensitivity assigned to land outside of the Order Limits). However, the inclusion of this will not change the following assessment or conclusions.
 2. The duration of the effects from the risks. Effects which are permanent, which is defined as continuing or enduring without fundamental or marked change (i.e. irreversible), or long lasting are more likely to be considered significant.
 3. The severity of the effects in terms of number, degree of harm to those impacted and the response effort required. Effects which trigger the mobilisation of substantial civil emergency response effort are more likely to be considered significant.
 4. The sensitivity of the identified receptors.
 5. The effort required to restore the environment. Effects requiring substantial clean-up or restoration efforts are more likely to be considered significant.

- 14.5.28 The ISEP Primer also identifies significance, based on criteria for notification of a major accident to the European Commission set out in Annex VI of the Seveso III Directive [7].
- 14.5.29 The ISEP Primer defines a major accident as “*an event... that threatens immediate or delayed serious environmental effects to human health, welfare and/or the environment and requires the use of resources beyond those of the client or its appointed representatives (i.e. contractors) to manage*” [10].
- 14.5.30 The ISEP Primer defines a disaster as “*a man-made/external hazard (such as an act of terrorism) or a natural hazard (such as an earthquake) with the potential to cause an event or situation that meets the definition of a major accident.*”
- 14.5.31 Using these references, the significance threshold for the risk of major accidents and disasters in relation the Proposed Development was set at anything which may cause loss of life or permanent injury and/or long lasting damage to an environmental receptor. This exceeds what might be considered as ‘usual’ incidents with mitigation covered by other topics, such as localised incidents with small or short-term effects.
- 14.5.32 All of the risks were identified and categorised according to those detailed in the National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies [21]. Where there was no credible pathway to the receptor or where the risk was considered to be of low likelihood and low consequence, and thus not significant, it was screened out of the impact assessment as it was not considered to have the potential to cause a major accident or disaster. Those risks with a credible pathway to a receptor or which were considered to be greater than low likelihood and low consequence, and in each case which could not be mitigated through primary and tertiary mitigation (known at the time of Stage 1 assessment) were screened into the assessment.

Stage 2: Risk Assessment

- 14.5.33 For this chapter, a Stage 2 risk assessment, set out in ES Appendix 14.1 Stage 2 risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6), has been undertaken utilising the results from the Screening stage undertaken in Stage 1, the EIA Scoping Opinion received from the Planning Inspectorate, the Preliminary Stage 2 risk assessment undertaken for the PEI Report and the design information available.
- 14.5.34 Primary and tertiary mitigation measures (as detailed in section 14.4) have been taken into consideration, and the likely impacts on receptors identified. The likelihood of effects occurring for each risk event has been considered. If a risk remains with the primary and tertiary mitigation, even if classed as low risk, it is classified as a residual consequence. The risk is then further assessed to determine if it could be described as ALARP or if secondary or additional mitigation, which goes beyond standard measures, is required to reduce it to ALARP.
- 14.5.35 For this Stage 2 risk assessment, risks which have been scoped in through the EIA Scoping Opinion have been included. Risks which have been scoped out at Stage 1, as agreed by the EIA Scoping Opinion on the basis that mitigation evidence will be present, have not been included, but the mitigation referenced in the EIA Scoping Opinion is detailed in section 14.4. Risks fully scoped out at scoping stage based on information provided in the EIA Scoping Report, and as agreed within the EIA Scoping Opinion have not been included in the Stage 2 risk assessment.

14.6 Assumptions and limitations

- 14.6.1 This section provides a description of the assumptions and limitations to the major accidents and disasters assessment:
1. Major accidents and/or disasters associated with construction, operation and decommissioning activities that fall within the scope of health and safety legislation (see Table 14-1) and associated obligations are not considered in the assessment.
 2. The risk identification exercise does not consider major accidents and/or disasters where risk events are not applicable to the geographic location of the Proposed Development e.g. volcanic activity.
 3. Risk events that are low likelihood and low consequence are not considered as they do not meet the criteria to be classed, within a risk assessment, as a likely significant effect and therefore do not satisfy the definition of a major accident and/or disaster.
 4. Risk events that are considered to be high likelihood and high consequence are not considered in the assessment, having been already mitigated or designed out as these would be considered unacceptable to the viability of the Proposed Development.

14.7 Baseline conditions

- 14.7.1 To provide an assessment of the expected significant adverse effects on the environment resulting from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to the risks of major accidents and disasters. It is necessary to identify and understand the baseline conditions in the study area. This provides a reference point against which potential changes in the risk of major accidents and disasters can be assessed.

Current baseline

- 14.7.2 For major accidents and disasters, the baseline is addressed at a Proposed Development wide level rather than examining individual components of the Proposed Development.
- 14.7.3 In accordance with the ISEP Primer, the national and community risk registers have been used to identify most of the potential risks for the Proposed Development. Hampshire and the Isle of Wight Local Resilience Forum have identified the most likely risks for the county (which are also identified at a national scale in the National Risk Register) in the Community Risk Register. These are: snow and cold, pandemic flu, industrial accidents, flooding, terrorism and widespread electricity loss. The baseline information for the risk events scoped into the assessment is presented in paragraphs 14.7.5 to 14.7.22. Pandemic flu is not included as the Proposed Development is not considered to have a risk pathway, whilst snow and cold are severe weather and were therefore agreed to be scoped out in the EIA Scoping Opinion. In line with the ISEP Primer, Additional risks have been identified based on the specific potential risks to and resulting from the Proposed Development which are fire, UXO, bird strike, pollution and transport accidents.

- 14.7.4 The baseline information within this section covers both baseline environmental conditions of relevance and relevant background information for the risks being assessed.

Flooding

- 14.7.5 ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), states that different areas of the Proposed Development pass through Flood Zones 1, 2 and 3 (land with varying probabilities of being flooded by rivers and/or the sea).
- 14.7.6 The risk of flooding for surface water receptors across the Proposed Development varies from low to high risk. Some areas are also at risk of failure due to flooding by a dam or reservoir. See ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), for location specific details.
- 14.7.7 The Proposed Development would operate at its full capacity during drought conditions. Approximate maximum flows vary across the pipelines but are highest at the Pipeline between the WRP site and Otterbourne Water Supply Works (WSW) and pipeline between the WRP site and Bedhampton Springs, at approximately 90 Ml/d. See ES Chapter 3 Description of Proposed Development, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), for full details.
- 14.7.8 Pipeline washout valves would be installed to enable the drain down of sections of the transfer pipeline in an emergency if required. At locations where trenchless construction methods are used, and therefore the Pipeline is installed at a greater depth, one isolation valve, one washout valve, and one air valve would be required at each side of the section of trenchless construction. Isolation valves are required to stop the flow of water through the Pipeline to facilitate repair or maintenance. They may be co-located with washouts and air valves and designed with an integral bypass for the balancing of upstream and downstream pressure to facilitate operation of the isolation valve.
- 14.7.9 As set out in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) except for the commissioning of the washout valves, there is no need to discharge any water from the washouts during operation. Commissioning, testing and maintenance of the washout valves would be undertaken using road-going tankers to capture the washout flows, so that no flows are released to the environment. In case of emergency, washouts may be discharged to the environment without constraint where necessary to alleviate the situation and protect public safety.
- 14.7.10 The functions of the break pressure tank overflows are to prevent backflow and over-topping. The overflows are provided as last-resort emergency devices; by design break pressure tank overflows should never occur. Normal system controls would manage the levels within the break pressure tanks. Overflows are tested at the commissioning phase. This testing water is either potable water or uses the pipeline testing water (originally potable sourced) and the resultant volume would be tankered away for disposal so that no flows are released into the environment.

Terrestrial biodiversity

- 14.7.11 There are 21 statutory designated sites within the Zone of Influence (the spatial scale at which features could be affected as a result of the Proposed Development and associated activities) of the Proposed Development, such as Special

Protection Areas, SACs, Ramsar sites, Sites of Special Scientific Interest and Local Nature Reserves. Across the Order Limits there are internationally important populations of Brent Goose and wading birds and extensive records of protected species. For additional information on non-statutory sites and the chapter baseline, see ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).

- 14.7.12 During the testing of the installed Pipeline between the WRP site and Otterbourne WSW, water storage lagoons would be required. Testing of the installed Pipeline involves filling and pressurising sections of the Pipeline to check for leaks or other operational issues prior to final commissioning of the section of pipeline. Water storage lagoons are not required for other pipeline components of the Proposed Development as the WRP site and Bedhampton Springs can be used for this purpose. The water storage lagoons would be used to contain the potable water used for the testing of the Pipeline and the cleaning of this water using a silt buster.

Unexploded ordnance

- 14.7.13 A UXO risk assessment has been undertaken for the Proposed Development and is detailed in ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). As part of this, a detailed UXO survey of the Order Limits was undertaken to examine the risk of any UXO being encountered during intrusive works during construction of the Proposed Development. The report details the risk level – from low to high – for the likelihood that the land within the Order Limits is contaminated with UXO for different areas of the Proposed Development. The UXO risk varies across the Proposed Development.

Nuclear submarine port

- 14.7.14 The EIA Scoping Report identified that some areas of the Proposed Development were within a 5km buffer of Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port. However, since the EIA Scoping Report was written, the Order Limits have been refined. Upon a reappraisal of the Proposed Development using the Order Limits, it is not located within 5km of the Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port, as illustrated in ES Figure 14.1 Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port location in relation to the Proposed Development, Volume III (Document reference 6.3, DCO Volume 6). Given the distance of over 10km between the port and the Proposed Development, no impact pathways have been identified which require assessment. Engagement has been undertaken with the MoD to confirm that neither the Southampton Docks nuclear submarine port nor the Proposed Development would be likely to impact each other in a manner exceeding that of other land uses in the vicinity. This approach was confirmed with local planning authorities in the Resilience Working Group meeting on the 2 December 2024. As such, the risk has been scoped out of the assessment.

Land quality and ground conditions

- 14.7.15 ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), identifies multiple sources of potential contamination including historic and modern landfills, sewage works, contamination associated with the railway and a corn mill, an infilled pond and watercourse, a

garage/depot/warehouse, old chalk pits, disused sand pits, an old quarry, a colliers pit, reservoirs, farms, a hospital, an oil fuel reservoir and a former brick works.

- 14.7.16 ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), highlights multiple areas where the Proposed Development intersects historic landfill sites. In particular, Harts Farm landfill, which was operational from the 1960s to the 1980s, and which is located within the Order Limits, specifically with the footprint of the WRP site.
- 14.7.17 A geoenvironmental assessment highlighted contaminants present in the Made Ground at the WRP site (as well as other areas across the Order Limits) including asbestos, groundwater impacted by ammonium and ground gas composed of elevated concentrations of methane and carbon dioxide. Additional details can be found in ES Appendix 11.2 Ground investigation reports, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6).

Fire

- 14.7.18 In Hampshire, 3,269 fires [27] were attended by the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire Service in 2024/25.
- 14.7.19 Given the Proposed Development is located in the south of England, which experiences higher average temperatures and lower average volumes of precipitation than other parts of the country, the risk of a fire is likely to be greater than in other parts of the country.

Utilities

- 14.7.20 Utilities plans for the study area show multiple gas pipes, including the Esso Southampton to London pipeline, other including high pressure pipes, water mains, wastewater pipes and electricity cables, underground and overground, crossing the corridor. There is also a virtual gas porting facility off Portsdown Hill Road.

Industrial accidents

- 14.7.21 Various chemicals would be transported to (by an external contractor), stored and used during operation of the Proposed Development. These include: antiscalent, hydrochloric acid, hydrogen peroxide, sodium hydroxide, citric acid and sodium bisulphite. A Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations assessment would be carried out by the Contractor in accordance with legislative requirements, to determine their levels of explosiveness, but they are all hazardous and explosive to some degree.
- 14.7.22 ES Chapter 3 Description of Proposed Development, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) sets out the design of the Pipeline. In order to transfer at maximum operation approximately 90 megalitres per day (MI/d) the water would be pumped under high pressure.

System failures

- 14.7.23 The WRP is located at a site north-west of Budds Farm Wastewater Treatment Works (WTW) providing (especially during drought conditions) approximately 60 MI/d of recycled water. The WRP site would have a minimum output of approximately 10MI/d. At maximum operation the WRP site would also produce a

maximum output of approximately 22Ml/d of reject water. Pumping stations would be located at the WRP site to pump process waste to the discharge network at Budds Farm WTW, recycled water to Bedhampton Springs and source water (from the reservoir) to Otterbourne WSW.

Future baseline

- 14.7.24 Major accidents and disasters does not have a topic specific future baseline due to reliance on other topics within the EIA for baseline and mitigation. It therefore refers to other topics' future baselines where relevant. ES Chapter 10 Carbon and climate change, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) sets out the baseline for future climate scenarios, including for average temperature increases for different scenarios. In all scenarios, the average temperature increases, thereby increasing the risk of fire during construction and operation of the Proposed Development. Climate change is likely to result in more extreme weather and increased flood risk (ES Appendix 19.1 Flood Risk Assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6)). The hydrology of the surface drainage network is expected to change with higher winter flows and lower summer flows with a greater number of storm-related flood flows.
- 14.7.25 Refer also to ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), and ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), for relevant future baselines and associated assessments.

14.8 Assessment of risk events and their potential effects

- 14.8.1 This section presents the assessment and description of the possible risk events and potential effects resulting from the construction, operation and decommissioning of the Proposed Development on the environment deriving from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and disasters. The potential adverse effects of the Proposed Development are identified taking into account primary and tertiary mitigation. Following assessment the need for secondary mitigation is considered in section 14.9 and residual effects are explained in section 14.10.

Construction effects

- 14.8.2 Table 14-8 sets out the findings of the Stage 2 risk assessment for construction. The full assessment which includes additional information on the source, pathway and receptor for each risk event is contained in ES Appendix 14.1 Stage 2 risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). All potential effects from risk events identified in section 14.7 have been mitigated to ALARP through primary and tertiary mitigation.

Operational effects

- 14.8.3 Table 14-8 sets out the findings of the Stage 2 risk assessment for construction and Table 14-9 for operation. The full assessment which includes additional information on the source, pathway and receptor for each risk event is contained in ES Appendix 14.1 Stage 2 risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2,

DCO Volume 6). All potential effects from risk events identified in section 14.7 have been mitigated to ALARP through primary and tertiary mitigation.

Table 14-8 Summary of risk identification and assessment for construction

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
Fire	<p>In Hampshire, 3,269 fires [29] were attended by the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire Service in 2024/25.</p> <p>Given the Proposed Development is located in the south of England, which experiences higher average temperatures and lower average volumes of precipitation than other parts of the country, the risk of a fire is likely to be greater than in other parts of the country.</p> <p>ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), highlights multiple areas where the Proposed Development intersects historic landfill sites. In particular, Harts Farm landfill, which was operational from the 1960s to the 1980s, and which is located within the Order Limits, specifically with the footprint of the WRP site.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>The Contractor will include the risk of fire and the way in which they will respond to an incident in an emergency management plan which they will produce. This will be agreed with relevant planning authority, in consultation with the fire and rescue/emergency services. This is secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7). This includes requirements for the Contractor to set out good practice measures with regards to the storage of fuel and plant, during construction, to reduce the risk of fire, as far as possible, from these sources. For the risk of fire from landfill gas during construction, gas management will be addressed through method statements, which include monitoring gas status for safe working practices. All flammable gases will be monitored during construction activities on the landfill site with work stopped if the threshold alarm is triggered. If natural ventilation is insufficient to maintain gas concentrations at safe levels, forced ventilation may be employed by pumping air into construction shafts and vacuum extraction of air from the bottom of construction shafts. Sources of ignition will also be prevented with equipment used that is designed not to operate at high temperatures or generate sparks, as well as a no smoking or naked flames requirement enforced at the site. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	<p>No as risk is mitigated to ALARP.</p>
Unexploded ordnance (UXO)	<p>A detailed UXO risk assessment has been undertaken for the Proposed Development and is detailed in ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). The survey examined the risk of any UXO being encountered during intrusive works during construction. The report details the risk level – from low to high – for the likelihood that the site is contaminated with UXO for different areas of the Proposed Development. This is low across the Proposed Development except for one area of moderate risk.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>Various types of mitigation have been recommended in ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6), appropriate to the risk level as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • an Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Safety and Awareness Briefing • site specific safety instructions • Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Engineer Watching Brief • magnetometer surveys <p>These requirements are secured in the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7). These measures are in line with principles for safety as set out in ES Appendix 3.1 Primary mitigation, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). For full details see ES Appendix 14.2 Detailed unexploded ordnance risk assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	<p>No as risk is mitigated to ALARP</p>
Bird strike at Southampton Airport	<p>There are 21 statutory designated sites within the Zone of Influence of the Proposed Development, including Special Protection Areas (SPA), SACs, Ramsar sites, Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) and Local Nature Reserves. Across the Order Limits there are internationally important populations of Brent Goose and wading birds and large records of species. For additional information, see ES Chapter 8 Terrestrial and</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p>	<p>Mitigation for the risk of bird strike (birds striking planes and causing an accident) is secured through the Outline CEMP (Document reference 7.1, DCO Volume 7).</p> <p>This has been agreed with Southampton Airport and includes measures such as installation of mesh fencing around the perimeter of the temporary storage lagoon, prior to filling with water, to prevent direct movement of wildfowl from adjacent</p>	<p>No as risk is mitigated to ALARP</p>

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the Proposed Development's vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
	<p>freshwater biodiversity, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6).</p> <p>During the testing of the installed Pipeline between the WRP site and Otterbourne WSW, water storage lagoons would be required. Testing of the installed Pipeline involves filling and pressurising sections of the Pipeline to check for leaks or other operational issues prior to final commissioning of the section of pipeline. Water storage lagoons are not required for other pipeline components of the Proposed Development as the WRP site and Havant Thicket Reservoir can be used for this purpose. The water storage lagoons would be used to contain the potable water used for the testing of the Pipeline and the cleaning of this water using a silt buster.</p>	<p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>terrestrial habitat. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	

Table 14-9 Summary of risk identification and assessment for operation

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the projects vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
Fire	<p>In Hampshire, 3,269 fires were attended by the Hampshire and Isle of Wight Fire Service in 2024/2025.</p> <p>Given the Proposed Development is located in the south of England, which experiences higher average temperatures and lower average volumes of precipitation than other parts of the country, the risk of a fire is likely to be greater than in other parts of the country.</p> <p>ES Chapter 11 Land quality and ground conditions, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), highlights multiple areas where the Proposed Development intersects historic landfill sites. In particular, Harts Farm landfill, which was operational from the 1960s to the 1980s, and which is located within the Order Limits, specifically with the footprint of the WRP site.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p>A Landfill Gas Risk Assessment has been undertaken and is detailed in ES Appendix 11.2 Ground investigation reports, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). Ground gas protection measures will be installed where required for construction of buildings on a landfill. These measures may include the structural barrier of the floor slab, ventilation measures and a gas resistant membrane. A specialist gas protection measures designer will be engaged to design these measures. These measures are in line with the design principles for safety as secured in the Design Principles Document, DCO Volume 5(Document reference 5.11, DCO Volume 5).</p> <p>Mitigation for the risk of fire during operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the Operational Environmental Management Plan (OEMP) (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). The OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) requires an Emergency Response Plan to be produced at a later stage. Measures which will be included in the Emergency Response Plan include staff training, routine safety audits, rescue planning and evacuation procedures and clearly defined protocols to minimise the likelihood of fire or other hazardous incidents. There will be requirements for the WRP site and Above Ground Plant (AGP) to have emergency backup generators in the event that mains power is interrupted. The measures will satisfy legislated</p>	<p>No as risk is mitigated to ALARP</p>

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the projects vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
			<p>plans and protocols, such as the Fire Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RRO), and be in line with best practice operational protocols.</p> <p>An Emergency Response Plan will be developed and will include mitigation to deal with wildfire. The AGP sites are susceptible to wildfire hazards exacerbated by drought and rising temperatures. To mitigate this, site-specific wildfire risk assessments will be undertaken and mitigation will include coordination with Fire and Rescue Services, and post-incident recovery actions. Vegetation management strategies have also been built into the design. These measures align with Natural England's NEER014 guidance and the Forestry Commission's wildfire resilience framework and relevant UK obligations under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 and HSE Fire Safety in Construction (HSG168) guidance. This is secured through the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7).</p> <p>This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	
Industrial accidents	<p>Various chemicals would be transported (by an external contractor) to, stored and used during operation of the Proposed Development. These include: antiscalant, hydrochloric acid, hydrogen peroxide, sodium hydroxide, citric acid and sodium bisulphite. A Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmospheres Regulations assessment would be carried out by the Contractor, in accordance with regulations, to determine their levels of explosiveness, but they are all hazardous and explosive to some degree.</p> <p>In order to transfer a volume of approximately 90MI/d water, the water would be pumped under high pressure, however exact velocities are not currently known.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p><i>Hazardous chemicals:</i></p> <p>Mitigation for the risk of hazardous chemical storage, use and chemical explosion during operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). It states that the Contractor must ensure compliance with relevant regulations. The Emergency Response Plan will contain measures on include staff training, routine safety audits, rescue planning and evacuation procedures and clearly defined protocols to minimise the likelihood of hazardous incidents. A suite of Incident Management procedures will also be produced by the Contractor.</p> <p><i>Pollution:</i></p> <p>The Contractor will implement a Pollution Management Plan which will satisfy legislated plans and protocols and be in line with best practice to manage pollution for operational matters. Measures in the Plan will include response procedures, timescales and notification requirements. This is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). In the event of a pollution incident, the measures will be employed, as well as the aforementioned safety measures for handling hazardous chemicals if required. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p> <p><i>Flooding and pipe leak or rupture:</i></p>	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the projects vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
			<p>Protective strips over the entire alignment of the pipelines constructed using open-cut methods will be identified to: ensure space and access to enable maintenance and repair, protect the integrity of the pipeline from external influences, for example loading, and protect third party assets from potential damage in the event of a rupture. The protective strip would restrict the landowner or occupier from undertaking certain activities that would restrict access to or affect the integrity of the pipeline. This includes restricting the following activities: erecting, constructing or placing any building wall or other structure whether permanent or temporary, undertaking of any piling or percussive works, alteration of ground levels, planting of trees, shrubs or other species other than as set out by the Applicant's 'Guide to Tree Planting near Mains and Sewers' [17] or other relevant standards and construction or laying of new pipe duct or cable across the pipeline at an angle of less than forty-five degrees formed by the pipeline and the new pipe duct or cable. Relevant landowners will be advised of the extent of the protective strip on their land. This will be determined by the depth and location of the pipeline.</p> <p>Isolation valves will be installed on the Pipeline to prevent flooding.</p> <p>Mitigation for the risk of flooding and pipe leak or rupture during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). It requires an Emergency Response Plan to be produced at a future stage. This will include Incident Management procedures that will cover accidents and pollution from a high pressure water pipe leak or rupture. Incident classification and escalation protocols in accordance with the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 will be produced and environmental containment measures, including coordination with environmental authorities, where reasonably practicable. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	
Pollution incidents	See industrial accidents section in Table 14-9 for baseline.	Fatality/injury to public Damage to infrastructure Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology	See industrial accidents section in Table 14-9 for mitigation.	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the projects vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
Flooding	<p>The risk of surface water flooding across the Proposed Development varies from low to high risk. Some areas are also at risk of failure flooding by a dam or reservoir. See ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), for location specific details.</p> <p>The Proposed Development would operate at its full capacity during drought conditions. Approximate maximum flows vary across the pipelines but are highest at the Pipeline between the WRP site and Otterbourne WSW Pipelines between the WRP site and Bedhampton Springs at 90 MI/d. In order to transfer this volume of water the water would need to be pumped under high pressure. See ES Chapter 3 Description of the Proposed Development, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), for full details.</p> <p>Pipeline washouts are provided to drain down sections of the transfer pipeline. Isolation valves would be required at intervals along the Pipelines and both sides of any major infrastructure or water bodies crossings. Isolation valves are required to stop the flow of water through the pipeline to facilitate repair or maintenance. They may be co-located with washouts and air valves and would be designed with an integral bypass for the balancing of upstream and downstream pressure to facilitate operation of the isolation valve</p> <p>Except for the testing of the washout valves, there is no need to discharge any water from the washouts during operation. Testing of the washout valves is proposed to be undertaken using road-going tankers to capture the washout flows, so that no flows are released to the environment.</p> <p>The functions of the break pressure tank overflows are to prevent backflow and over-topping. The overflows are provided as last-resort emergency devices; by design break pressure tank overflows should never occur.</p> <p>Normal system controls would manage the levels within the break pressure tanks. Overflows are tested at the commissioning phase. This testing water is either potable water or uses the pipeline testing water (originally potable sourced) and the resultant volume would be tankered away for disposal so that no flows are released into the environment.</p>	<p>Fatality/injury to public</p> <p>Damage to infrastructure and buildings</p> <p>Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species</p> <p>Damage to cultural heritage and archaeology</p>	<p><i>Pipe leak or rupture</i> See the industrial accidents mitigation in Table 14-9 for details on a pipe leak or rupture mitigation.</p> <p><i>Reservoir interaction</i> The potential for, and mitigation for, an interaction between Havant Thicket Reservoir and the Proposed Development during the operational phase of the Proposed Development is examined in ES Chapter 19 Water environment, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), and ES Appendix 19.1 Flood Risk Assessment, Volume II (Document reference 6.2, DCO Volume 6). This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p> <p><i>Washouts</i> Mitigation for the emergency use of washouts during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). Washouts may be discharged to the environment without constraint where necessary to alleviate the situation and protect public safety. Following the emergency discharge, the clean-up operation would implement all reasonably practicable measures to mitigate environmental impacts. This is a very unlikely scenario. An Emergency Response Plan will be developed by the contractor and will set out these procedures. The mitigation will follow the same measures as those set out for flooding and pipe leak or rupture.</p> <p>The risk of INNS from the release of raw water from an emergency washout release or pipe leak or rupture will be mitigated through the preparation and implementation of an EIMP which will be developed by the Contractor post-consent as secured in the INNS Biosecurity Plan (Document reference 7.10, DCO Volume 7). The EIMP would set out the processes and procedure for releasing and managing water in an emergency, including procedures to assess and identify the threat of INNS associated with the emergency event, for containment and eradication and a plan for regular monitoring and follow-up. Works are also proposed at Otterbourne WSW to ensure the addition of source water transferred from Havant Thicket Reservoir would not introduce pathways for the spread of INNS. The INNS Treatment at Otterbourne WSW would treat the waste flow that is produced by the existing treatment process at Otterbourne WSW, once all flows have passed through Otterbourne WSW. Following INNS Treatment, these flows would be released to the environment via the Applicant's existing</p>	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the projects vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
			<p>network. The INNS Treatment would produce sludge, which would be disposed of via a suitably licensed disposal facility, and would be considered to be free of INNS. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p> <p><i>Break pressure tank overflows</i> Mitigation for the emergency use of overflows for Break Pressure Tanks BPT-K and BPT/IPS-E during the operation of the Proposed Development is secured in the OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7). It is very unlikely to occur as a situation leading to an overflow will require the simultaneous failure of all of the following multiple system elements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unexpected downstream cessation or throttling of flows • Failure of normal automated control systems to maintain normal BPT levels • Undetected operationally exceptional rise in BPT levels, failure of automatic emergency response or unresponsive manual intervention from the control room upon reaction to an alarm. <p>However, were this to occur and an overflow happen, the flows would eventually top the overflow within the collection chamber and flow out to the discharge location. If the overflow volume is less than the effective volume of the collection chamber, i.e. the overflow stops before reaching the outlet to discharge, no flows will be released to the environment, and this volume will be removed by suction tanker. The overall control strategy and designated discharge location will be finalised post-consent. In the case of a flooding event, the mitigation would be the same as that set out for pipe leak or rupture. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.</p>	
Transport accidents	For the baseline for the hazardous chemicals to be used on-site see the industrial accidents section.	Fatality/injury to public Damage to infrastructure Damage to habitats and injury/fatality of species	ES Chapter 18 Traffic and transport, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6), assesses the risk of hazardous loads during operation of the Proposed Development. It concludes that the minor increase in daily vehicle movements involving hazardous loads means there is no likely significant effect and therefore the risk is negligible. If a spillage were to occur, the pollution prevention measures set out in the industrial accidents: hazardous chemicals section will mitigate the risk. This mitigation is sufficient to reduce the risk to ALARP.	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

Risk event [28]	Baseline information	Reasonable worst consequence if event did occur	Mitigation (primary and tertiary)	Could this result in significant adverse effects on the environment from the projects vulnerability to major accidents and disasters with mitigation in place?
			For risks associated with hazardous loads see the industrial accidents section in Table 14-9. For risks associated with pollution incidents see the pollution incidents section in Table 14-9.	
System failures	The WRP is located at a site north-west of Budds Farm WTW providing up to (especially during drought conditions) approximately 60 megalitres per day (MI/d) of recycled water. The WRP would have a minimum output of approximately 10MI/d. At maximum operation the WRP would also produce a maximum output of approximately 22MI/d of reject water. Pumping stations would be located at the WRP site to pump process waste to the discharge network at Budds Farm WTW, recycled water to Bedhampton Springs and source water (from the reservoir) to Otterbourne WSW.	Fatality/injury to public	All the pumps and equipment in the pumping stations at the WRP site are equipped with remote monitoring and control which will indicate an issue with water quality were there to be a problem. The WRP site will be operational 24 hours a day and it is assumed that operatives will be in attendance 24 hours a day with approximately five operatives during the day and three during the night. An emergency generator will be provided as part of the WRP site which will be used when required. The emergency generator will be a fuel powered generator used to create electrical power in an emergency situation, for example during lack of power. In these events, the emergency generator will run until power to the WRP site is returned. This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP. The OEMP (Document reference 7.7, DCO Volume 7) requires the Contractor to develop an Emergency Response Plan which will include a suite of Incident Management procedures. These will complement and be consistent with the Pollution Management Plan, setting out procedures to manage water quality, in alignment with legislated procedures and industry best practice. This mitigation reduces this risk to ALARP.	No as risk is mitigated to ALARP

14.9 Mitigation, monitoring and enhancement

14.9.1 This mitigation section includes measures envisaged to prevent or mitigate the significant adverse effects of such events on the environment and/or the Proposed Development and details of the preparedness for and proposed response to such emergencies. Mitigation measures are defined in ES Chapter 5 EIA approach and methodology, Volume I (Document reference 6.1, DCO Volume 6) with primary mitigation and tertiary mitigation for major accidents and disasters being presented in section 14.4 of this chapter. A summary of relevant mitigation is provided in section 14.8 of this chapter which concludes all risks can be mitigated to reduce the risk to ALARP.

Secondary mitigation

14.9.2 No secondary mitigation is required for major accidents and disasters. All risks have been adequately mitigated through primary and tertiary mitigation.

Monitoring

14.9.3 There are no expected significant adverse effects arising from the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to risks of major accidents and/or disasters either during construction, operation or decommissioning of the Proposed Development that require monitoring.

14.10 Summary of residual effects

14.10.1 Table 14-10 provides a summary of the residual effects relating to the construction, operation and decommissioning of the Proposed Development with regard to major accidents and disasters receptors.

Table 14-10 Summary of residual effects

Risk event	Residual effects		
	Construction	Operation	Decommissioning
COMAH sites	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Activities within the scope of other health and safety legislation	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Widespread electrical failure	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Systems failure	Scoped out	No expected significant adverse effect	Scoped out
Malicious attack	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Fire	No expected significant adverse effect	No expected significant adverse effect	No expected significant adverse effect
Explosion from UXO	No expected significant adverse effect	Scoped out	No expected significant adverse effect

Risk event	Residual effects		
	Construction	Operation	Decommissioning
Bird strike at Southampton Airport	No expected significant adverse effect	Scoped out	No expected significant adverse effect
Industrial accidents	Scoped out	No expected significant adverse effect	Scoped out
Pollution incidents	Scoped out	No expected significant adverse effect	Scoped out
Flooding	Scoped out	No expected significant adverse effect	Scoped out
Severe weather	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Air quality	Scoped out	Scoped out	Scoped out
Transport accidents	Scoped out	No expected significant adverse effect	Scoped out

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from
Southern
Water. 

The logo graphic for Southern Water, featuring three stylized, white, wavy lines that resemble water or waves, positioned to the right of the word "Water".